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EYES ON THE PRIZE
BY NANCY A. WELSH AND BOBBI McADOO
MERE FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. THE
term mediation was confused
reguiarl x with meditation.
Much has changed. The courts, fre-
quently derided as overcrowded and
expensive for individual litigants and
the pubiic, now rely on mediation
to resolve cases and reduce dockets,
Attorneys and judges are advocates;
many have become mediators them-,
selves.
Disputants generally express
satisfaction with the process. It is not
surprising that mediation-along with
other ADR processes-has achieved
institutionalization in the courts,
public agencies and the private and
nonprofit sectors.
We are now embarking on the
next stage: professionalization. There
are increasing references to "dispute
professionals" or "profi'ssional media-
tors." Presumably these terms signal
something more than simply being
paid for dispute resolution services or
achieving popular recognition of the
title "mediator."
It seems that dispute resolution
practitioners, especially mediators,
now seek the status and autonomy that
society grants to laxyers, accountants
and doctors. Mediators have attempt-
ed to adopt many of the characteristics
that distinguish professions from oc-
cupations. They have created national
organizations that offer vibrant confer-
~)
ences, hammered out ethical codes
and persuaded sponsoring courts and
agencies to establish training and ex-
perience requirements for admission
to mediator panels.
This progress, however, should
not obscure a central problem. Profes-
sions, as distinct from occupations, are
upon which the work of mediation
is based. Consequenty, it should
come as no surprise that there is no
consensus regarding the approach,
skills or ethics mediators should share.
The Model Standards for Mediators
certainly exist, but many practicing
mediators seem unaware of them or
In reality, the mediation field is simply not as professional
as many of us would like to believe that it is.
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characterized by a distinct knowledge
system that sersves is a conceptual
map binding togeter the meribers
of the professi n and framing the
vay in which they think about, reason
through and act upon problems. This
shared sense of identity enables the
profession to determine appropriate
mechanisms for training, regulating
entvr and enforcing ethical and com-
petent practice.
Among mediators, however, it
is difficult to discern any substantial
agreement regarding a systematic
body of esoteric, abstract knowledge
any other discrete set of norms that
should be used to guide and evaluate
their work. Perhaps mediation advo-
cares' faith in the potential of this field
keeps us fron seeing the reality of
Insttutionalization-that many "pro-
fessional" mediators' practices and
even their values are Influenced more
by the needs of the institutions within
which they work, or of the repeat p ay -
ers they often serve, than the inde-
pendently-held values of a mediation
"profession." In reality the mediation
ficid is simplx not as professional as
man o us a.ould like to believe that it
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is. Professionalism will be within reach
only after mediators acknowledge cur-
rent problems and limitations-and
work to correct them.
To be fair, we are unaware of
any extensive research regarding
mediators' compliance with the eth-
ics espoused in the Model Standards.
Particularly in the court-connected
context, however, it is easy to find
quantitative and qualitative research
with worrisome implications. Add
alarming anecdotes and conversations
to the mix, and it seems time to take a
serious look at whether mediators can
claim to be members of a profession
that is faithful to certain key principles
and knowledge.
Faithfulness to self-determination
The Model Standards, even
in their proposed revised form, de-
scribe party self-determination as a
"fundamental principle of mediation
practice" which may only need to be
balanced with "a mediator's duty to
conduct a quality process" consistent
with mediators' ethics. Yet, there are
many examples of mediators behaving
inconsistently with party self-determi-
nation-both in terms of parties' con-
trol over the decision to mediate and
over the mediation process and out-
come. Moreover, this behavior seems
not to be tied to any commitment to
quality process.
Paities' control over the decisionz to
mediate. Today, many court-connected
mediation programs rely on mandatory
referrals and make it difficult for par-
ties to opt out. This system of coerced
education for lawyers and parties is
largely responsible for mediation's
widespread use, but it is also in ten-
sion with party self-determination, We
are aware that some mediators rec-
oncile this tension by making it easy
for parties to opt out of the mediation
session. We are not aware of any me-
diators, however, who refuse to handle
mandatory referrals. In fact, we worry
that many more mediators view their
authority to require parties' continued
participation as an essential tool rather
than a threat to party self-determina-
tion.
Also, despite the strong likeli-
hood that pro se parties are unaware of
their rights, less able to negotiate for
themselves when facing a represented
party and thus less able to exercise
meaningful self-determination, many
trial judges are nearly as likely to or-
der them into mandatory mediation as
they are to order represented parties to
participate in the process. We are not
aware of any mediator who has refused
to mediate one of these cases, even
when the pro se party faces a repre-
sented part.
Parties' self-determination also
is not respected when judges force
participation in mandatory mediation
sessions and refuse to provide the
merits-based decision requested by
a party who has moved for summary
judgment. Recent research, however,
reveals that a worrisome percentage of
trial judges in the state of Minnesota,
for example, take just this approach.
One judge explained: "Don't bother
the court until you have exhausted
efforts" to settle the case. Another
commented: "It is a needless expen-
diture of limited court time to rule
on summary judgment when the case
may settle." A third judge wrote pith-
ily: "Uncertainty breeds resolution."'
We are not aware of any mediator who
has refused a court's mediation refer-
ral under these circuistances, despite
the clear signal from at least one of the
parties that she wished to receive a
decision regarding the application of
the !aw.
Finally when one judge was asked
recently about the ethics of serving as
a mediator in a case, learning confiden-
tial information, and then trying that
case, he had a ready answer. He said
that before he mediates, he brings all
the parries together and, on the record,
reassures them that if they are unable
to settle, he will try the case as though
he did not earn -anything from the me-
diation. Although the judge then gives
the parties the choice about whether to
have him proceed as their mediator, it
is difficult to see how that choice truly
respects party self-determination.
The coercion evident in these
examples is reminiscent of the power
imbalance that generally underlies
and infects mandatory arbitration
clauses in employment and consumer
contracts. Like the employees and
consumers who enter unknowingly
or reluctantly into these contracts, the
parties mediating under the circum-
stances described above are not freely
assenting to participate in mediation.
They are simply acquiescing under
the constraints of a severe power
imbalance. How then can the media-
tors-or "mediating" judges-claim to
be upholding the fundamental princi-
ple of all parties' self-determination?
If mediation is a profession with a
clear and shared set of norms, judges
would not even think about mediat-
ing a case and then presiding over its
subsequent trial. They would never
assume that the parties' assent to
mediation under these circumstances
is truly voluntary. In addition, at this
point in the evolution of the field,
professional mediators should be seen
refusing to accept mandator\ referrals
or, at the very least, making it easy for
the parties to opt out after they have
been educated regarding the potential
benefits of the mediation process. This
should be especially true for media-
tion sessions involving pro se parties.
Professional mediators who are asked
to mediate cases in which summary
judgment motions are pending should
refuse unless the parties freely agree
to proceed.
In addition, professional media-
tors should urge courts with successful
court-connected mediation programs
to abandon the crutch of mandatory
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referrals. Indeed, mediators could em-
ulate those arbitrators who have such
strong concerns about mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in the consumer context
that they now refuse to handle such
cases. These arbitrators are behaving
like professionals, whose faithfulness
to a set of ethical norms is stronger
tsin their acceptance b, or referrals
from, powerful institutions.
Pai-ies' contiro! over proarss and
outron. There are aiso numerous
examples of mediators behaving in a
manner inconsistent with parties' selt-
determination in their control over the
mediation process and its outcomes.
The case Ia i for example, now in-
cludes sad tales in which judges have
mediated cases and then ref.sed to
recuse themselves from proceedings
to decide the merits of objections to
the mediated settlements. In one such
case, the judge thought the case had
settled; one of the parties disagreed.
In the subsequent chalienge, the
judge chose to enforce the supposed
settlerisent. The appellate court af-
firmed, rejecting the argument that
the judge's actions violated the ap-
pearance of fairness doctrine.-' Faith-
fuiness to party self- determination
Was not even considered.
In court-connected faiiil mc-
diation, and now in some general civil
mediation progr'as, mediators are re-
quired to provide reconimendations to
judges for cases that do not settle. Ap-
parent ,any mi ediators do not ike
-his requirement, but continue to take
thiese cases and provide recommien-
dations, even th-ough Parties" control
within the mediation rocess c'nd over
the ultimate outcome are fikeiy to be
affected bs their knowledge ctat the
mediator may make disclosurs to -the
presi ng judge.
NMediators' behavior during me-
diation sessions also can undermine
parties' sel-determination. Especially
in the civil court context mediators
session and into caucus-if they even
have a joint session-reducing the par-
ties' direct ind active participation un
the determination of the issues to be
decided, the norms to be invoked and
the options that might exist for resoluJ-
tion.
Evaluation by mediators also oc-
cus in many mediation sessions. This
intervention is not inconsistent with
Parties' self-deteriination per se.
Indeed, respectful and nonaggressiv e
evaluation can be consistent with party
sel-detertination. \\e are concerned,
however, tha marn mediators do not
understand-o- care-that g -agnsice
or p 'ina lr c eaiaton is iot consis-
tent with party self-determination.
Indeed, if attorneys expect mediators
to aggressive\l reconcile clients to the
reality of the Law it seeis that media-
tors are allowving lawyers to use them
to circumvent the lawyers' obligation
to abide by their clients' ultimate an-
thority over the decision to settle.
Similarlyi mediators may be al-
ici aunt to selcs to be used inappro-
priately if they agree to serve is cCourt
programs that focus on settlement as
the core criterion of success or that
require mediations to be con'pleteu
Jickly-in an hour or so. Nediators
working under these conditions are
likely to be tempted to propose spe-
cific settlement terms, and research
shows thaa such proposais can under-
minc parties' perceptions of media-
Jon as a fir process. Further, partes'
agreemen t to settemens tetrasis more
ikely to be the res of pressure than
of a process devoted to party sef-de-
termination.
In these exampies. ediators are
either crea'ng conditions themselves
that Tai to show respect far the fi-
damenta ' principe of party self-de-
ternis'nat' or are agrecing to mediate
under court-created circumstances
that make it unlikely that parti self-
determination wlj be at the core of
,I Fa - 1 cia1 m U. aO aCCtS-
als, we should demand of oursehes
and our field that we add special value,
not merely serve as understudies who
mimic the primary actors in a system.
So, for example, professional me-
diators should:
" object oudly when judges medi-
ate and taen preside over subse-
quent trials or motions to vacate
or enforce mediated settlement
agreements
* refuse to make recommendations
to judges in cases that do not
settle
* know that evaluations are riot
appropriate until after both par-
ties-the clients, unless they
clearl choose to defer to their
attorneis-have had the opportu-
nity to tell their stories and know
that they have been sufficiently
heard by the mediator and each
other
* never propose specific settlement
terms
* refuse to participate in media-
tion sessions that are too short to
permit the time for the parties to
be fully heard before they moxe
to the possibilities for resoution,
and
" encourag-e parties to think about
their agreement before signing a
binding setlement agreement-
or include a short-term cooling off
provision that o d allow rescis-
sion withoult penals
O' course, this is a lot to expect
o mediators alone, Courts also should
be o'gated to design programs that
protect par" self-determination. Pro-
fessiona's, however, stand up for their
ethics and serve as the catalysts for
institutional reform.
Faithfulness to impartiality
There are also signs that media-
tots ,re not behaving consisteny with
,he ehical duty to be isparial and,
even ore spccificlc, the dut- to
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"disclose, as soon as practicable, all ac-
tual and potential conflicts of interest
that are reasonably known to the me-
diator and could reasonably be seen as
raising a question about the mediator's
impartiality."
We are aware of mediators who
have chosen not to disclose their pre-
vious work with a repeat player at the
table-an insurance company, school
district, or major employer-even
when their interaction suggests fa-
miliarity. Xe suspect this is simply
because such previous work will raise
understandable concerns about the
mediator's impartiality, especially if
the repeat player is a regular source of
business.
If professional mediators truly
identify with the need for impartial-
it,. they will always disclose their prior
work with one of the parties and do it
in such a way that both parties-espe-
cially the one-time player-truly ex-
ercise self-determination in choosing
whether to continue or find another
mediator,
Faithfulness to justice
Mediators should be committed to
providing parties with both an experi-
ence of justice (procedural justice) and
fair outcomes (substantive justice).
We are concerned that mediators'
failure to convey their commitment
to justice, whether defined by the par-
ties in the full and creative exercise
of their self-determination or deter-
mined by the parties' agreement to
follow the prescriptions of social-that
is, legal-norms, may help to explain
the following developments.
Comment 5 to Rule 2.4 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct now makes it crystal clear
that lawyers are under no ethical
obligation to be candid with me-
diators. Rather, they are bound
only by the requirements of Rule
4.1, which provides that a lawyer
"shall not knowingly ... make a
false statement of material fact or
law" or "fail to disclose a material
fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client." Thus,
lawyers owe no greater duty of
candor to court-connected, court-
appointed mediators than they do
to opposing counsel. Is this devel-
opment consistent with the goal
of protecting the integrity of our
public courts and the justice to be
delivered by our litigation system?
Is it consistent with the notion
that mediators are profession-
als who have earned autonomy
and respect because they serve a
beneficial and important societal
purpose?
Though Rule 2.4 of the Model
Rules now requires a lawyer serv-
ing as a mediator to explain to an
unrepresented party that he or she
is serving as a third-party neutral
and to distinguish this role from
that of the lawyer representing
a client, the rule provides abso-
lutely no guidance regarding the
unique characteristics or respon-
sibilities of the mediator. Should
the lawver-mediator say: "I don't
represent you as a lawyer, but
you can be assured that I am here
to facilitate a fair process, one
that respects your full participa-
tion and self-determination and
ultimately produces what you
regard as a fair result, whether a
settlement is reached or not?" Or
should that mediator say: "I don't
represent you as a lawyer, and you
need to know that all I care about
is the settlement of this case, so
watch out for the tricks I might
play to manipulate you into saying
'yes' to me and the other side?"
Either statermnt seems to fulfill
the lawyer-mediator's obligation
under Rule 2.4, and the second
disclosure just might be more
honest.
Looking ahead
Every stage in the evolution of the
field of mediation has had its promise
and its problems. Mediation has
achieved widespread institutionaliza-
tion. Now, mediators have their eyes
on the prize of professionalization.
Like all meaningful prizes, though,
this one requires mediators to prove
themselves worthy.
The core concepts of self-deter-
mination, impartiality and justice rep-
resent mediation's roots-and hope-
fully, its future. We dare to hope that
these concepts-along with a better
theoretical and practical understand-
ing of what exactly they mean and of
the conditions that enhance them-
will one day bind us together as an
honored and valuable profession.
Committing to these values is
likely to mean, as the song "Eyes on
the Prize" proclaims:
So keep your eyes on the prize,
Don't be dismayed...
Deep in your heart,
You must believe:
Everything is gonna be aright,
Everything is gonna be a/right,
Everything is gonna be a/right
someday.
And we say amen.
Endnotes
See, Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Look
Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Les-
sons from the Institutionalization of Court-Con-
nected Mediation, 5 NEVADA L. J. - (2005).
2 DeMers v. Lee & Lee, 2000 WL264022
(Wash. App. Div. 1) (unpublished opinion).
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
1.2(a).
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